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JEL Classification: J24,C23, L83. 
 
Keywords: Aging, individual effects, firm effects, match effects, Formula One. 
 
Acknowledgments: We would like to thank seminar participants at the University Ca’ Foscari of Venice, the University of 
Milan, and conference participants at the Brucchi-Luchino conference, Bologna, December, 11-12, 2008 and the Third ICEE 





*   INSEAD (fabrizio.castellucci@insead.edu) 
**   University Ca’ Foscari of Venice and CSEF (mpadula@unive.it) 




1.  Introduction 
2.  The Formula One Industry 
3. Identification 
 3.1.  Drivers effects 
 3.2.  Drivers and teams effects 
 3.3.  Match effects 
4.  The Age-productivity Gradient 
4.1.  Results from baseline specifications 























Aging is a global phenomenon. If older individuals are less productive, an aging
working population can lower aggregate productivity, economic growth and ﬁscal
sustainability. Therefore, understanding the age-productivity gradient is key in a
aging society. However, estimating the eﬀect of aging on productivity is a daunting
task. First, it requires clean measures of productivity. Second, unobserved hetero-
geneity at workers, ﬁrms and workers/ﬁrms level challenges the identiﬁcation of the
age-productivity gradient in cross-sectional data. Longitudinal data attenuate some
identiﬁcation issues, but gives rise to the problem of partialling out the eﬀect of
aging from the pure eﬀect of time. Third, the study of the age-productivity link
requires investigating the role of experience and of seniority. Fourth, jobs diﬀer with
respect to the skills they require and diﬀerent skills may evolve very diﬀerently over
diﬀerent working careers.
The literature on micro data has tackled some of these issues, but some remain
unresolved. The available evidence seems to indicate that the elderly do suﬀer a
drop in productivity. Medoﬀ and Abraham (1980, 1981), and Waldman and Avolio
(1986) use supervisors’ rating to measure productivity and show that older workers
are less productive than younger ones. These early studies have been important
attempts to tackle the above mentioned issues, but still suﬀer from severe short-
comings. First, being most of these studies based on cross-sectional data, they are
unable to disentangle the eﬀect of age from the eﬀect of tenure, and are unable to
control for the fact that workers may self-select into ﬁrms according to their pro-
ductivity. Second, supervisors may tend to over-reward senior workers for loyalty
and past achievements and therefore supervisors’ rating might be only an imperfect
proxy for individual productivity.
These shortcomings are later addressed in the literature. Stephan and Levin
(1998) study researchers in the ﬁelds of Physics, Geology, Physiology and Biochem-
istry. The number of publications and the standard of the journals they appear in
are found to be negatively associated with the researchers’ age. Similar evidence is
found in the ﬁeld of economics where Oster and Hamermesh (1998) conclude that
older economists publish less than younger ones in leading journals, and that the rate
of decline is the same among top researchers as among others.1 The productivity
of individuals doing “creative” jobs, such as authors and artists, is measured by the
quantity and sometimes the quality of their output. The evidence seems to indicate
that the elderly are less productive. Kanazawa (2003) shows that age-genius curve
of scientists bends down around between 20 and 30 years. Similar curves are also
found for jazz musicians and painters. These papers share a common feature, the use
of piece-rate samples, which provide a clean measure of productivity. However, they
cannot easily separate the workers’ ability from ﬁrm eﬀect and control accordingly
for workers selection into ﬁrms.
To overcome these problems a number of studies use employer-employee matched
data-set. The evidence based on such data-sets, where individual productivity is
1The same pattern applies to Nobel economists (Dalen, 1999)
2measured as the workers’ marginal impact on the company’s value-added, ﬁnds an
inverted U-shaped work performance proﬁle (Andersson et al. (2002), Cr´ epon et al.
(2002), Ilmakunnas et al. (2004), Haltiwanger et al. (1999), Hægeland and Klette
(1999)).
Individuals in their 30s and 40s have the highest productivity levels. Employees
above the age of 50 are found to have lower productivity than younger individuals,
in spite of their higher wage levels. These papers basically estimate the eﬀect of
aging on productivity by comparing output (or value added) per worker in plants
(or ﬁrms) with a diﬀerent age composition of the workforce. A problem with the
fact that most studies on age-productivity diﬀerences are based on cross-sectional
evidence (with the notable exception of Dostie (2006)) is that reverse causality may
be at work: for example, successful ﬁrms generally increase the number of new
employees and this mechanically leads to a younger age structure. Thus, a younger
workforce could be the eﬀect rather than the cause of ﬁrms good performances.
In order to overcome this problem, this paper casts the age-productivity test
in its correct setting: within the worker-ﬁrm pair. We rely on a unique data-set,
that records the race performances for all Gran Prix Formula One (F1) drivers from
1991 to 1999. The data provide a clean measure of productivity and have enough
information to identify the age-productivity proﬁle after controlling for a host of
workers and ﬁrms characteristics. In particular, we are able to account for tenure
and experience – on top of drivers, ﬁrms and match eﬀects – and still identify the
age-productivity gradient. We ﬁnd that productivity peaks at the age of 30-32 and
then decreases. Moreover, in accordance with the ﬁndings of Abowd et al. (1999),
we show that workers eﬀects are more important than ﬁrms and match eﬀects in
determining productivity, as they account respectively for 25, 12, and 2 percent of
the explained variability. Consistently, we ﬁnd that omitting either ﬁrms or match
eﬀects (or both) in a model with workers eﬀects does not alter the age-productivity
gradient.
This paper complements the available results on the age-productivity gradient
and provides new insights on the determinants of individual productivity focusing
on an admittedly special sample. However, the usefulness of professional sports as
a labor market laboratory has long been recognized (Kahn, 2000) and many labor-
related questions (e.g. racial discrimination; the relationship between managerial
quality and performance) have been tackled using professional sports data (Kahn,
1991, 1993, 2006). Of course, it would be unwise to readily generalize our results to
the general population. Yet, the neat identiﬁcation strategy obtained in this setting
makes our results a useful supplement to those obtained in more standard contexts
with – perhaps – less clean identiﬁcation procedures.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the F1 industry
and data. Identiﬁcation is discussed in Section 3. Section 4 presents the results and
Section 5 concludes.
32 The Formula One Industry
With its 350 Millions TV viewers per race, F1 racing is considered today the most
popular sport worldwide. The Auto Club de France held the ﬁrst Grand Prix race
in 1906, but it was not until 1950 that the ﬁrst World Championship series was held,
linking national races in the UK, Monaco, the US, Switzerland, Belgium, France,
and Italy. In that year, the form of racing previously called Formula A came to
be known as Formula One and became the pinnacle of automotive technology. We
believe that there are several grounds on which to focus on F1 to investigate the
age-productivity relationship.
First, there are few contexts that provide cleaner measures of performance dif-
ferences than that of F1 racing. In F1 racing, there are a limited number of racing
teams and a limited number of races; in a given year, all of the teams participate
in all the races on the circuit.2 Since all teams are racing on the same racetracks
and have cars that must adhere to the same rules, performance diﬀerences are easy
to measure. Second, although performance is clear after either a race or a racing
season is completed, there is a certain degree of uncertainty on how a team is going
to perform in either the next race or next season. In particular, given the inherent
complexity of F1 cars and given that cars are usually entirely redesigned between
seasons, it is uncertain how a new car will stand against competition.
There is a third reason for using F1 racing data, which has to do with the
teams seeking constantly to enhance performance by developing their products in
collaboration with their suppliers and their drivers. Most of the teams are owned
by the world’s major automobile manufacturers whose motivation is, at least in
part, the exposure to “cutting-edge” technological advances in car design. Unlike
other forms of motor-sport, such as Champ Car or IRL where all competitors race in
almost identical cars built using standard components, F1 racing teams must design,
construct and race their own chassis (for this reason F1 teams are oﬃcially called
Constructors and a special championship, the World Constructors Championship, is
held every year and awarded to the team that scores the most championship points
during a racing season). As F1 teams can, and often do, buy the remaining parts of a
racing car from external suppliers, a coordination problem for F1 teams emerges both
in design and racing of the car. Each F1 team seeks to design a car that it regards
as the best compromise of aerodynamic performance, maneuverability, structural
rigidity, and engine power within the rules imposed by the governing body of F1, the
F´ ed´ eration Internationale de l’Automobile (FIA). By imposing strict constraints on
dimensions, weight, and safety, these rules limit the degrees of freedom in designing a
car by taking the interrelations among the various design dimensions to the extreme.
For instance, to increase the horsepower of an engine, designers have to consider that
the increased heat needs to be dissipated by a redesigned cooling system with bigger
radiators and, consequently, an increased weight. Given the constraints in size and
2We refer to F1 racing teams as “team” as customarily called in the industry. However, these
“teams” are in reality middle-sized ﬁrms averaging 164 employees and $34.5 million dollars in assets
in 1997. Besides the racing department in charge of running the cars during the race, these ﬁrms
have R&D, Marketing, Production, and Testing departments.
4weight, other parts of the car need to be redesigned, making sure that the ﬁnal
outcome - a racing car - not only produces the desired performance consistently in
every race, but also passes compulsory safety tests.
A fourth reason for focussing on F1 has to do with the role of drivers. Although
they are believed to be less important for the ﬁnal performance than in the past,
drivers also play a relevant role in the success of a F1 car. Not only do drivers need to
skillfully drive the car during the race itself, but they also need to be involved in the
development of a speciﬁc car design. Despite the heavy use of telemetry to obtain
detailed information on a car’s behavior on the track, the driver is still the ultimate
provider of feedback to the car’s engineers and mechanics. Providing feedback on
a F1 car is diﬀerent than providing feedback on any other racing car. Even drivers
considered talented in other racing series need time to acquire this skill. Ultimately,
a car’s performance is determined not only by a driver’s sheer talent, but also by
her/his ability to provide feedback. For this reason, every time a team wants to hire
a new driver, it tries to ﬁnd somebody who, in the words of one team owner, “is
immediately operational”. That is, the team seeks someone who has proven in the
past s/he can help the team extract the highest performance from the car.
The identiﬁcation of the age-productivity gradient requires reliable and repeated
measures of productivity over time. Moreover, to partial out individual from ﬁrm
eﬀects, one has to focus on high turnover industries, where employee change often
employers. F1 is the case of an industry where transitions between employers and
employee are frequently observed. This provides a further reason to focus on F1.
Abowd et al. (2002) discuss the group-connectedness in employer-employee match
data and highlight its role in disentangling the ﬁrm from the individual eﬀect. Table
1 provides an example of the degree of connectedness provided by the F1 data.
Data are drawn from http://www.formula1.com and http://www.4mula1.ro,
which provide information on races, drivers and teams. We sample all races that
took place between the 1991 and the 1999 seasons. In each race, performance is
measured on the basis of the ﬁnal position of the car. In our time window, points
are awarded to those cars that ﬁnish in the ﬁrst six places. 10 points are awarded for
ﬁrst; 6 points are awarded for second, 4 for third, 3 for fourth, 2 for ﬁfth, 1 for sixth,
and 0 for the other placements. Therefore, the sum of points awarded does not grow
from race to race and is ﬁxed to 26. This means that in measuring productivity with
the points awarded to each driver at the end of the race, one does not need to allow
for aggregate eﬀects to capture growth from race to race (or from season to season)
in aggregate productivity. This is quite an advantage over measures of productivity
based on wages and value added, since both increase (or decrease) over time because
of aggregate time eﬀects, not related to aging.3 Beyond the ﬁnal position of each
car, we also know the time to complete the race. This an equally valid measure of
car performance, but contrary to points it is aﬀected by the aggregate eﬀect on cars’
speed of technological evolution.
3The problem of identifying time from age eﬀects is common to many settings, such as the
evaluation of the age-consumption and saving proﬁle, the age-income proﬁle, and the estimation of
depreciation of capital goods (or durable goods) from price data.
5Each record in our data-set provide car-race level information. Therefore, our
data-set contains 3,180 observations including all races from 1991 to 1999. For
each observation, we have the car, the chassis and the engine numbers; the name,
nationality, team, the tenure with the team and the year of birth of the driver;
the date of the race, the weather conditions in the day of the race, the country
where the race is held, and the track length; the nationality, the assets, the number
of employees and the age of the team, the name, nationality and the age of the
technical director. Overall, we have data on 89 drivers, 22 teams, 8 seasons, and 16
races per season. Table 2 collects the drivers’ names, Table 3 the teams names, and
Table 4 a sample of the variables available for each race in the 1994 season.
Selected summary statistics are provided in Table 5. The across races mean of
drivers scores is just above 1, which hides substantial variability between drivers
(1.19) and races (1.99). The age of drivers is on average 29.43 and drivers start
driving F1 cars at the age of 25.16. The age of entry in F1 varies across drivers.
Esteban Tuero enters at the age of 20, Toshio Suzuki at the age of 38. We observe
the entire career of 36 out of 89 drivers, for 30 drivers the career is left truncated,
for 17 right truncated and for 6 both left and right truncated. During their careers,
drivers change often team: 58 percent of the drivers change team at least once, 36
percent twice, 16 percent three times, 4.5 percent four times, and 2.2 ﬁve times.
Moreover, Andrea De Cesaris, Eric Van De Poele, J. J. Lehto, Jarno Trulli, Johnny
Herbert, Mika Salo change team once in a season, Philippe Alliot twice.
Table 5 also contains information on teams and their technical directors. F1
teams count on average 146.8 employees, the average age of technical directors is
44.5 and the age of drivers’ entrance in F1 is just below 30. These variables will be
used in the estimation exercise, as we clarify in the next section.
3I d e n t i ﬁ c a t i o n
To identify the eﬀect of age on drivers performance we provide three alternative
models. In the baseline model, which we call Model I, we just allow for drivers ﬁxed
eﬀects.4 The estimation of such model would just require panel data on drivers
performance and does not exploit any information on teams. To disentangle teams
from drivers eﬀect we estimate our Model II, which uses the matched employer-
employee structure of the data. Finally, Model III recognizes that drivers mobility
between teams might depend on match speciﬁc eﬀects. Comparing the three models
allows to understand the importance of drivers, teams and match eﬀects in the
estimation of the age-productivity link.
4An alternative identiﬁcation strategy is to assume random drivers eﬀects. This approach has
obvious computational advantages over ours in the context of large-scale employer-employee data-
sets (see Woodcock (2006) for an application to wage data). However, it requires assuming that
drivers ability is uncorrelated with all regressors including age. In our setting this assumption is
not likely to hold, as also conﬁrmed by the Hausman test that compares the ﬁxed and the random
eﬀect models and reveals the presence of systematic diﬀerences in the estimated coeﬃcients.
63.1 Drivers eﬀects
Productivity, as measured the points at the end of the race, of driver i at time t is:
yit = µ + θi + α × ageit + εit
where θi is driver i ability and ageit is driver’s i age at time t measured in years.
We assume that:
E(yit|ageit)=µ + θi + α × ageit
It is immediate to verify that α is identiﬁed if:
E(yit+1|ageit+1) − E(yit|ageit)=α (1)
which requires that E(εit−εit−1|θi,age it,age it−1) = 0. This leads to our ﬁrst model
for drivers performance. Model I can be estimated by regressing yit on a set of drivers
dummies and age. Notice that drivers can sort into teams according to unobserved
individual characteristics. Adding workers ﬁxed eﬀects allows to control for the
sorting due to drivers time-invariant characteristics. However, for the estimates of
Model I to be unbiased, one does require that mobility is exogenous, conditional on
age and drivers eﬀect.5
Diﬀerently, if drivers mobility between teams depends on omitted characteristics
(e.g. the quality of the team) that are correlated with age, α cannot be consistently
estimated in Model I. To understand how this can happen consider the case where
young drivers move to higher quality teams while old drivers do the opposite. The
omitted teams characteristics would then be captured by age, possibly generating
a spurious inverse U-shaped relationship between ageing and productivity. More
formally, E(εit − εit−1|θi,age it,age it−1) cannot be equal to zero if the performance
varies systematically between teams and mobility is related to age. To account for
the eﬀect of teams characteristics on drivers performance we turn to our second
model.
3.2 Drivers and teams eﬀects
Model II assumes that the drivers performance depends also on team characteristics
that are ﬁxed over time:
yijt = µ + θi + ψj(it) + α × ageit + εijt
where j(it) is the team to which driver i belongs at time t. It easy to verify that the
team eﬀect is not identiﬁed if no driver changes team from one year to the other.
For driver s, who does not change team between years t and t + 1, the analogue of
(1) is:
E(ysjt+1|agest+1) − E(ysjt|agest)=α (2)
5We also estimate a baseline model without drivers eﬀect. The results, not reported for brevity,
show that the exogenous mobility assumption, in a model with age eﬀects only, is rejected.
7while for driver m who changes from team j to team k,i ti s :
E(ymkt+1|agemt+1) − E(ymjt|agemt)=α + ψk(mt+1) − ψj(mt) (3)
Equations (2) and (3) identify the team from the age eﬀects. Model II can be
estimated by regressing yijt on a set of drivers and team dummies and age. Model
II provides consistent estimates of the age eﬀects, unless drivers mobility between
teams depends on a match speciﬁc team eﬀect. If that is the case, the estimates of α
are not consistent and therefore one needs to add match eﬀects to the model.6 This
leads us to specify and estimate our third model, which accounts for match eﬀects.
3.3 Match eﬀects
Allowing for match speciﬁc eﬀects on the top of team and drivers eﬀect poses a
fundamental identiﬁcation problem. Since the match eﬀects results from the inter-
action of the driver and team eﬀects, the model with match, team and driver eﬀects
is over-parametrized. Suppose for the sake of exposition that α is equal to zero and
that the model is:
yijt = µ + θi + ψj(it) + φij + εijt (4)
where φij is the match eﬀect. If E(εijt|θi,ψ j(it),φ ij) = 0, the sample analog of the






w h e r ei ti sa s s u m e dt h a td r i v e ri stays with team j for Tij years. If the number
of matches is equal to M,t h e r ea r eM sample moments like (5). With N drivers
and J teams, identiﬁcation of driver, team and match eﬀects requires recovering
from M sample moments, N + J + M + 1 parameters, which is an impossible task.
Identiﬁcation thus requires additional assumptions. There are many alternative
identiﬁcation assumptions. One possibility is to give up on identifying driver from
team and match eﬀects. Assuming that drivers performance changes with age, the
model can be written as:
yijt = µ + θi + ψj(it) + φij + α × ageit + εijt (6)
The linearity of the right-hand side of (6) ensures that α can be consistently esti-
mated if one can ﬁnd a suﬃcient statistic for the sum of driver, team and match
eﬀects. This leads to the following model:
yit − yij = α(ageit − ageij)+ηit (7)
6Of course, the estimates of α are still consistent if age and match eﬀects are uncorrelated, given














where Tij is the number of years driver i stays with team j.
This approach allows to identify the age eﬀect, but is silent about the driver,
the team and the match eﬀect.7 We therefore consider an alternative possibility.
Namely, we exploit the richness of our data to model the match eﬀects. In particular,
we allow for match eﬀects to depend on drivers age and assume that they are related
to the distance between the age of the driver and the age of the team, and that
between the age of the driver and the age of technical director. Furthermore, we
assume that the match eﬀects also depend on whether the team and the driver have
the same nationality, and whether the technical director and the driver have the
same nationality.
Section 4.1 shows results from the three above-described models, extended so
as to include a host of time-varying factors that may aﬀect the age-productivity
proﬁle. Section 4.2 presents results from speciﬁcations that control for a number
of additional confounding factors that may lie behind our ﬁndings. Among other
things, we will control for the changing quality of the opponents and will be able to
separately identify the eﬀect of age from the eﬀect of tenure and experience.
4 The age-productivity gradient
4.1 Results from baseline speciﬁcations
We estimate our three models in turn: model I, featuring drivers eﬀect only, model
II featuring drivers and teams eﬀects, and model III, where we add match eﬀects.
For each of them we consider two speciﬁcations. A baseline speciﬁcation with no
additional controls and an extended speciﬁcation which allows for a list of additional
covariates including years dummies for 1995-1997, number of entrants in each race,
a dummy for rainy weather at the day of the race, the track-length, the number of
race-laps, a dummy for whether the race takes place at the drivers home.
The results are reported in Table 6 and show that the coeﬃcient on the linear
term of age is positive while the coeﬃcient on the quadratic term is negative in both
the baseline and the extended speciﬁcation.
Figure 1 displays the age and productivity proﬁle for the three models respec-
tively with drivers, drivers and teams, and drivers, teams and match eﬀects for
the baseline speciﬁcation. The proﬁles are obtained by projecting the estimated
quadratic polynomial on age. The ﬁgure shows that productivity increases with
7We also estimate (7) and get very similar results to those obtained estimating Models I and II.
9age, until the age of 30 and decreases afterward. The maximum is reached between
age 30-32. Our estimates also imply that productivity increases by just below half
point (0.46) between the age of 20 and 21 in models I and II, and by just above half
point (0.52) in model III; and decreases by just below 1/5 of point (0.18) between
the age of 34 and 35 in models I and II, and 0.123 in model III.
Overall, our estimates imply that age accounts for as much as 4.5 percent of ex-
plained variance of productivity, while drivers eﬀects explain as much as 25 percent,
and teams and match eﬀect account respectively for 12 and 2 percent. Results are
consistent with Abowd et al. (1999) who ﬁnd that ﬁrm eﬀects are not as important
as individual eﬀects in explaining individual wage variation in France.
Even though we are able to reject the null that drivers and teams eﬀects are
equal to zero, the diﬀerences across models and speciﬁcations are not sizeable.8 As
models with teams and match eﬀects are meant to account for the endogeneity of
mobility decisions, the ﬁnding that the age-productivity gradient does not diﬀer
much across models suggest that the endogeneity bias is small. This is a notable
ﬁnding in a high-turnover industry such as the F1 industry (see section 2) which
may suggest that the bias induced by endogenous mobility decisions may be even
smaller in industries characterized by lower rates of job mobility.9
Summingup, this ﬁrst set of results shows that GP drivers have an age-productivity
proﬁle consistent with that predicted by the theory of human capital. Whether or
not this is an artifact of our data is the concern to which we devote the rest of this
section.
4.2 Results from additional speciﬁcations
Interactions between drivers eﬀects and race characteristics
The list of factors that might lie behind our results is potentially large, even if
our estimates allow for drivers, teams and match eﬀects. At the top of the list,
factors that change across drivers and between races (and seasons). For instance,
some drivers can be better at racing on wet ground, or on long tracks. Therefore,
the change in their performance from race to race might depend on the weather
conditions at the day of the race, or on the tracks characteristics, which might
confound the eﬀect of age.
We therefore add to our extended speciﬁcation interaction terms between drivers
eﬀects and tracks length, driver eﬀects and number of race-laps, and driver eﬀect
and a dummy for rainy weather at the race day. The results are reported in Table
7 and are very similar to those reported in Table 6. Productivity increases by 0.45-
0.50 between the age 20 and 21 in all models, and decreases by 0.15-0.21 between
the age of 34 and 35.
8We do not reject at the standard level the null that the age coeﬃcients are equal across models
I and II, while we do reject the null that they are equal across models II and III.
9Booth et al. (1999) examine job mobility and job tenure in the UK over the period 1915-90.
They ﬁnd that British men and women held an average of ﬁve jobs over the course of their work
lives. In our data we observe the entire career for 36 out of 89 drivers. Those drivers change team
almost once a year during their career.
10Controlling for all the interactions between drivers eﬀects and race characteristics
in the same regressions does not alter the picture. The results are provided in Table
8, and Figure 2 shows the age-productivity proﬁle. Productivity peaks between the
age 30 and 32, and has a concave shape in accordance with human capital theory.
Changing rules
Changes in the rules between seasons might also aﬀect diﬀerently diﬀerent drivers.
This is another potential factor that might confound the age eﬀects. For instance,
major innovations were introduced in 1994. Refuelling was permitted again with
the use of a standardized refuelling rig, the active/reactive suspension systems was
banned, and so were the electronic driver aids, such as the traction control, launch
control. Moreover, after San Marino accident in 1994, where drivers Roland Ratzen-
berger and Ayrton Senna died, restrictions imposed on the front and rear wings, the
size and shape of the rear diﬀuser, and a wooden “plank” introduced on the under-
side of the car to raise the ride height. We therefore add to our speciﬁcation the
interaction of dummies for years after 1994 with the drivers eﬀects. The results are
reported in Table 9 and are again quite similar to those reported in the Tables 6-8.
The age-productivity proﬁle is concave and peaks at the age of 30-32, as shown in
Figure 3.
Quality of opponents
Another source of bias that might aﬀect the estimates of the relationship between
aging and productivity may derive from the absence of a proper correction for the
quality of the opponents. If, for example, the average quality of opponents decays
over time one may underestimate the eﬀects of aging on productivity. Changes in
the average quality of the opponents may be due either to the changing quality of
incumbent drivers or to compositional changes in the pool of drivers. To address the
ﬁrst problem Table 10 presents results controlling for the quality of the opponents,
as measured by the cumulative number of points of the rivals since the start of the
season. While the table shows that the quality of opponents does have a negative
inﬂuence on drivers performances, the coeﬃcients of age and age square are hardly
aﬀected. Next, to address the potential eﬀect of compositional changes in the pool
of drivers due to the fact that low productivity drivers may sort themselves out of
the profession in younger ages, we control for non-random attrition using propensity
score weights. Predicted probabilities of staying in the sample are obtained running
a probit on a dummy equal to one if the driver is present in the following year (and
zero otherwise) on the cumulative number of points in the season and a quadratic in
age. The propensity score weights are then computed on the basis of these predicted
probabilities and used in the estimation of the age-productivity gradient. Table 11
presents the results that conﬁrm the ﬁndings of the previous tables.
Experience and tenure
The shape of the age productivity gradient is likely to depend on drivers experience
and possibly tenure. Drivers’ performance might improve with experience, and also
11longer driver-team relationship might have a positive eﬀect of performance, allowing
the driver to learn better about his car.
Disentangling the eﬀect of experience and tenure on productivity from that of
age is often hard. Experience and tenure coincide for those worker who do not move
between jobs, and both change hand-in-hand with age. The high turnover among GP
drivers allows to distinguish experience from tenure. We measure the former with
the age of entry in F1, and the latter with the duration of team-driver relationship for
each driver. However, the age of entry in F1 is ﬁxed for each driver and therefore it is
absorbed into the driver ﬁxed eﬀect. To understand if experience and tenure matter
for the estimated age-productivity proﬁle, we thus exploit the fact that sum of scores
at the end of each race is ﬁxed. This allows adding the normalization equation that
the sum of driver eﬀect is zero, and therefore estimating models that account for the
eﬀect of experience and tenure on productivity and separate that from the eﬀect of
age and the individual eﬀect. The results for experience are reported in Table 12
and those for tenure in Table 13. The Tables reveal that both experience and tenure
matter, but leave the overall picture unaﬀected.
Past performances
Aging is not the only and possibly the main driver of performance changes over
time. Productivity changes across races (and seasons) might reﬂect past perfor-
mances. State dependence in the productivity process come from the good perfor-
mances in the past having a positive or a negative eﬀect on current performances.
The former case might arise when past bad performances make drivers less conﬁdent
and then drive less aggressively. The latter, when bad past performances increase
the incentives to drive better in future races. While we cannot identify the precise
channel from which state-dependency in performances arises, we can control for past
performance. This is done in Table 14, where we add to the set of regressors the
scores in the previous race. The results suggest that past has a positive eﬀect on
current performance, and that the shape of the age productivity gradient is not very
much aﬀected.
Non-parametric speciﬁcation
So far we have restricted the age eﬀect to enter the productivity equation in
a quadratic fashion. Such assumption is made for convenience. To model more
ﬂexibly the eﬀect of age on productivity, we replace the linear and quadratic age
terms with a set of age dummies. The results are reported in Table 15. The baseline
category is age between 20 and 22: productivity increases with age until age 32-
34 and then starts decreasing. Therefore, allowing for a more ﬂexible speciﬁcation
moves the peaks by around 1 year, but leaves the concavity unchanged. Moreover,
as one can see from Figure 4, productivity increases relatively little at the beginning
of the career, and more from the age of 28 until the peak, and it decreases quite
dramatically at the very end of the career.
125 Conclusions
Measuring the age-productivity gradient has both positive and normative impli-
cations. The shape of the age-productivity proﬁle has implications for aggregate
productivity, economic growth, the sustainability of pension systems and the de-
sign of tax systems. Moreover, the optimality of wage schemes based on seniority
depends on the extent to which productivity decreases at old ages.
The empirical evaluation of the age-productivity link is, however, problematic, in
that it requires repeated measures of productivity and possibly employer-employee
match data. Data with such features are seldom available. Good proxies of pro-
ductivity are provided by piece-rate samples, such as those on scientist or criminals.
However, such data do not allow to disentangle the ﬁrm and the individual eﬀects on
productivity. This issue can be addressed by employer-employee match data, which,
however, often lack of convincing measures of productivity. Here, we use very special
data, which share the advantages of both the piece-rate and the employer-employer
match data: data on GP drivers.
GP drivers change often employer in their careers, which makes identiﬁcation of
ﬁrm and individual eﬀects possible. Moreover, it is easy to observe their productivity,
which we measure as the points awarded to each driver at the end of each race. This
is an objective measure of productivity and is not aﬀected by aggregate growth,
since the sum of points awarded in each race is constant over time.
We ﬁnd that the age-productivity proﬁle is concave and reaches the maximum
between the age of 30 and 32. Our result is robust to a number of checks, which
control for the fact that there might be factors changing across races (or seasons)
which aﬀect drivers diﬀerently. Moreover, we show that the productivity increases
by around 2.6 points between the age of 20 and 30, and decreases by 2.4 points
between the age of 30 and 40. We also show that drivers, teams and match eﬀect
matters, as they account respectively for 25, 12, and 2 percent of the explained
variance of productivity. However, omitting team and match eﬀects from the driver
eﬀect model does not alter the overall picture on the age-productivity. Since it is
very likely that in a population of GP drivers mobility depends on team and match
characteristics, we see this result as indicating that the endogeneity of mobility does
not aﬀect how productivity evolves with age. While the result pertain to a peculiar
population, we might expect the eﬀect of endogenous mobility to be even smaller in
those populations where the role of employer and match speciﬁc human capital is
less important.
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Note. The ﬁgure shows the relation between age and productivity. Age is recorded on the horizontal
axis, and α1 × ageit + α2 × age
2
it on the vertical axis.
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Note. The ﬁgure shows the relation between age and productivity, accounting for a full set of
interactions between drivers eﬀects and track length, number of race-laps, and a dummy for rainy
weather. Age is recorded on the horizontal axis, and α1 × ageit + α2 × age
2
it on the vertical axis.
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Note. The ﬁgure shows the relation between age and productivity, accounting for a full set of
interactions between drivers eﬀects and track length, number of race-laps, a dummy for rainy
weather, and a dummy for season 1994. Age is recorded on the horizontal axis, and α1 × ageit +
α2 × age
2
it on the vertical axis.
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Driver, team and match effect
Note. The ﬁgure shows the relation between age and productivity, accounting for a full set of
interactions between drivers eﬀects and track length, number of race-laps, a dummy for rainy
weather, and a dummy for season 1994, and modeling the age eﬀect with a piece-wise function. Age
is recorded on the horizontal axis, and the age dummies coeﬃcients on the vertical axis.
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Note. The table shows an example of the degree of connectedness among teams and drivers.
Table 2. The drivers
Aguri Suzuki Alain Prost Alessandro Zanardi Alex Caﬃ Alexander Wurz
Andrea Chiesa Andrea De Cesaris Andrea Montermini Ayrton Senna Bertrand Gachot
Christian Fittipaldi Damon Hill David Brabham David Coulthard Derek Warwick
Domenico Schiattarella Eddie Irvine Emanuele Naspetti Enrico Bertaggia Eric Bernard
Eric Van De Poele Erik Comas Esteban Tuero Fabrizio Barbazza Franck Lagorce
Gabriele Tarquini Gerhard Berger Giancarlo Fisichella Gianni Morbidelli Giovanna Amati
Giovanni Lavaggi Heinz-Harald Frentzen Hideki Noda Ivan Capelli J. J. Lehto
Jacques Villeneuve Jan Lammers Jan Magnussen Jarno Trulli Jean Alesi
Jean Christophe Boullion Jean Denis Deletraz Jean Mark Gounon Johnny Herbert Jos Verstappen
Karl Wendlinger Luca Badoer Marc Gene Marco Apicella Mark Blundell
Martin Brundle Massimiliano Papis Mauricio Gugelmin Michael Andretti Michael Schumacher
Michele Alboreto Mika Hakkinen Mika Salo Nicola Larini Nigel Mansell
Norberto Fontana Olivier Beretta Olivier Grouillard Olivier Panis Paul Belmondo
Pedro Diniz Pedro Lamy Pedro De La Rosa Perry McCarthy Philippe Alliot
Pierluigi Martini Ralf Schumacher Ricardo Rosset Ricardo Zonta Riccardo Patrese
Roberto Moreno Roland Ratzenberger Rubens Barrichello Shinji Nakano Stefano Modena
Stephane Sarrazin Taki Inoue Tarso Marques Thierry Boutsen Toranosuke Takagi
Toshio Suzuki Ukyo Katayama Vincenzo Sospiri Yannick Dalmas
Note. The table contains the names of all drivers contained in our sample.
20Table 3. The teams
Arrows BAR/Supertec Benetton Brabham Dallara-Judd
Ferrari Fondmetal-Ford Forti-Ford Jordan Larousse
March-Ilmor Prost Lola Lotus McLaren
Minardi Moda-Judd Paciﬁc-Ilmor Sauber Simtek
Stewart Williams
Note. The table contains the names of all teams contained in our sample.
21Table 4. The races
Grand Prix Date Winning Driver Team Laps Time
Brazil 27/03/1994 Michael Schumacher Benetton-Ford 71 1:35’38.759
Paciﬁc 17/04/1994 Michael Schumacher Benetton-Ford 83 1:46’01.693
San Marino 01/05/1994 Michael Schumacher Benetton-Ford 58 1:28’28.642
Monaco 15/05/1994 Michael Schumacher Benetton-Ford 78 1:49’55.372
Spain 29/05/1994 Damon Hill Williams-Renault 65 1:36’14.374
Canada 12/06/1994 Michael Schumacher Benetton-Ford 69 1:44’31.887
France 03/07/1994 Michael Schumacher Benetton-Ford 72 1:38’35.704
Britain 10/07/1994 Damon Hill Williams-Renault 60 1:30’03.640
Germany 31/07/1994 Gerhard Berger Ferrari 45 1:22’37.272
Hungary 14/08/1994 Michael Schumacher Benetton-Ford 77 1:48’00.185
Belgium 28/08/1994 Damon Hill Williams-Renault 44 1:28’47.170
Italy 11/09/1994 Damon Hill Williams-Renault 53 1:18’02.754
Portugal 25/09/1994 Damon Hill Williams-Renault 71 1:45’10.165
Europe 16/10/1994 Michael Schumacher Benetton-Ford 69 1:40’26.689
Japan 06/11/1994 Damon Hill Williams-Renault 50 1:55’53.532
Australia 13/11/1994 Nigel Mansell Williams-Renault 81 1:47’51.480
Note. The table contains the names of all races, the date, the winning drivers, the team, the number
of laps, and the time to end of the winners for all races in the 1994 season.
22Table 5. Summary statistics
Mean Standard deviation decomposition
Overall Between Within
Drivers’ pts. scored 1.06 2.38 1.19 1.99
Drivers’ age 29.43 4.45 4.43 1.52
Drivers’ age of entrance 25.16 2.90 3.2 0
Teams’ age 16.68 13.26 9.88 9.34
Size of team 146.8 54.11 36.99 38.94
Techn. dir. age 44.5 6.56 6.62 4.56
Techn. dir. age of entrance 29.94 8.53 6.50 6.33
Note. The table contains the mean, and the standard deviation decomposition between and within
drivers for the variables used in the regressions.
23Table 6. Age and productivity
Model I Model II Model III
Baseline Extended Baseline Extended Baseline Extended
Age 1.407 1.415 1.400 1.412 1.464 1.478
(0.218)*** (0.219)*** (0.273)*** (0.276)*** (0.281)*** (0.286)***
Age square -0.023 -0.023 -0.023 -0.023 -0.025 -0.024
(0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)***
drivers eﬀects 11.35 11.24 5.47 5.37 5.82 5.59
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Team eﬀects 11.04 10.15 12.06 12.04
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Note. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. One star means 5 percent signiﬁcant,
two 1 percent, three 0.1 percent. The baseline speciﬁcation contains a quadratic in age and drivers
dummies in Model I, drivers and teams dummies in Model II, drivers and teams dummies, and
the absolute diﬀerence between drivers age and technical directors’ age, drivers age and teams age
(measured as years from the foundation), a dummy for whether drivers and technical directors
belong to the same nationality, and a dummy for whether drivers and teams belong to the same
nationality. The extended speciﬁcation adds years dummies for 1995-1997, number of participants
to each race, a dummy for rainy weather at the day of the race, the track-length, the number of
race-laps, a dummy for whether the race takes place at the drivers home. The bottom part of the
table shows the F-statistics for the null that the drivers eﬀects are zero and the team eﬀects are
zero.
24Table 7. Age and productivity, interactions, one by one
Track length Race laps Rain
Model I Model II Model III Model I Model II Model III Model I Model II Model III
Age 1.435 1.439 1.507 1.427 1.434 1.503 1.430 1.419 1.495
(0.223)*** (0.282)*** (0.291)*** (0.224)*** (0.282)*** (0.291)*** (0.222)*** (0.280)*** (0.290)***
Age squared -0.024 -0.023 -0.025 -0.023 -0.023 -0.025 -0.023 -0.023 -0.025
(0.004)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.004)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.004)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)***
Note. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. One star means 5 percent signiﬁcant, two 1 percent, three 0.1
percent. Model I has drivers eﬀect, Model II drivers and teams eﬀects, Model III drivers, teams and match eﬀects. Each
regression contains a quadratic on age, and years dummies for 1995-1997, number of participants to each race, a dummy for
rainy weather at the day of the race, the track-length, the number of race-laps, a dummy for whether the race takes place
at the drivers home. Columns headed by ‘Track length’ interact the driver eﬀect with the length of tracks, columns headed
by ‘Race laps’ interact the driver eﬀect with the number of laps, by ‘Rain’ interact the driver eﬀect with a dummy for rainy
weather.
Table 8. Age and productivity, interactions, all
Model I Model II Model III
Age 1.394 1.406 1.478
(0.230)*** (0.291)*** (0.301)***
Age squared -0.023 -0.023 -0.024
(0.004)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)***
Note. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. One star means 5 percent signiﬁcant,
two 1 percent, three 0.1 percent. Model I has drivers eﬀect, Model II drivers and teams eﬀects,
Model III drivers, teams and match eﬀects. Each regression contains a quadratic on age, and years
dummies for 1995-1997, number of participants to each race, a dummy for rainy weather at the day
of the race, the track-length, the number of race-laps, a dummy for whether the race takes place at
the drivers home, and interactions of the driver eﬀect with the length of tracks, of the driver eﬀect
with the number of laps, and of the driver eﬀect with a dummy for rainy weather.
25Table 9. Age and productivity, changes in the rules
Model I Model II Model III
Age 1.416 1.313 1.401
(0.246)*** (0.321)*** (0.335)***
Age squared -0.023 -0.021 -0.023
(0.004)*** (0.005)*** (0.006)***
Note. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. One star means 5 percent signiﬁcant,
two 1 percent, three 0.1 percent. Model I has drivers eﬀect, Model II drivers and teams eﬀects,
Model III drivers, teams and match eﬀects. Each regression contains a quadratic on age, and years
dummies for 1995-1997, number of participants to each race, a dummy for rainy weather at the day
of the race, the track-length, the number of race-laps, a dummy for whether the race takes place
at the drivers home, interactions of the driver eﬀect with the length of tracks, with the number of
laps, with a dummy for rainy weather, and with a dummies for years after 1994.
Table 10. Age and productivity, quality of opponents
Model I Model II Model III
Age 1.419 1.417 1.482
(0.219)*** (0.277)*** (0.286)***
Age squared -0.023 -0.023 -0.024
(0.004)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)***
Quality of opponents -0.018 -0.015 -0.015
(0.008)* (0.008) (0.008)*
Note. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. One star means 5 percent signiﬁcant,
two 1 percent, three 0.1 percent. Model I has drivers eﬀect, Model II drivers and teams eﬀects,
Model III drivers, teams and match eﬀects. Each regression contains a quadratic on age, and years
dummies for 1995-1997, number of participants to each race, a dummy for rainy weather at the day
of the race, the track-length, the number of race-laps, a dummy for whether the race takes place at
the drivers home.
26Table 11. Age and productivity, non-random attrition
Model I Model II Model III
Age 1.534 1.386 1.431
(0.239)*** (0.274)*** (0.287)***
Age squared -0.025 -0.022 -0.024
(0.004)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)***
Note. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. One star means 5 percent signiﬁcant,
two 1 percent, three 0.1 percent. Model I has drivers eﬀect, Model II drivers and teams eﬀects,
Model III drivers, teams and match eﬀects. Each regression contains a quadratic on age, and years
dummies for 1995-1997, number of participants to each race, a dummy for rainy weather at the day
of the race, the track-length, the number of race-laps, a dummy for whether the race takes place
at the drivers home. We control for non-random attrition by using a propensity score matching
estimator that predicts the probability of staying in the sample running a probit on a dummy equal
to one if the driver is present in the following year (and zero otherwise) on the cumulative number
of points in the season and a quadratic in age.
Table 12. Age and productivity, Experience
Model I Model II Model III
Age 1.415 1.402 1.478
(0.191)*** (0.234)*** (0.240)***
Age squared -0.023 -0.022 -0.024
(0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)***
Age in F1 -0.423 -0.294 -0.442
(0.157)** (0.172) (0.183)*
Note. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. One star means 5 percent signiﬁcant,
two 1 percent, three 0.1 percent. Model I has drivers eﬀect, Model II drivers and teams eﬀects,
Model III drivers, teams and match eﬀects. Each regression contains a quadratic on age, and years
dummies for 1995-1997, number of participants to each race, a dummy for rainy weather at the day
of the race, the track-length, the number of race-laps, a dummy for whether the race takes place
at the drivers home, interactions of the driver eﬀect with the length of tracks, with the number of
laps, with a dummy for rainy weather, and with a dummies for years after 1994.
27Table 13. Age and productivity, Tenure
Model I Model II Model III
Age 1.188 1.340 1.402
(0.221)*** (0.277)*** (0.285)***
Age square -0.019 -0.021 -0.023
(0.004)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)***
Tenure 0.015 0.013 0.014
(0.004)*** (0.005)** (0.004)**
Note. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. One star means 5 percent signiﬁcant,
two 1 percent, three 0.1 percent. Model I has drivers eﬀect, Model II drivers and teams eﬀects,
Model III drivers, teams and match eﬀects. Each regression contains a quadratic on age, and years
dummies for 1995-1997, number of participants to each race, a dummy for rainy weather at the day
of the race, the track-length, the number of race-laps, a dummy for whether the race takes place
at the drivers home, interactions of the driver eﬀect with the length of tracks, with the number of
laps, with a dummy for rainy weather, and with a dummies for years after 1994.
Table 14. Age and productivity, Past Performance
Model I Model II Model III
Age 1.200 1.267 1.340
(0.190)*** (0.235)*** (0.240)***
Age squared -0.020 -0.020 -0.022
(0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)***
Pts. in the prv. race 0.152 0.101 0.091
(0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.018)***
Note. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. One star means 5 percent signiﬁcant,
two 1 percent, three 0.1 percent. Model I has drivers eﬀect, Model II drivers and teams eﬀects,
Model III drivers, teams and match eﬀects. Each regression contains a quadratic on age, and years
dummies for 1995-1997, number of participants to each race, a dummy for rainy weather at the day
of the race, the track-length, the number of race-laps, a dummy for whether the race takes place
at the drivers home, interactions of the driver eﬀect with the length of tracks, with the number of
laps, with a dummy for rainy weather, and with a dummies for years after 1994.
28Table 15. Age and productivity, age dummies
Model I Model II Model III
22 <A g e≤ 24 0.269 0.454 0.456
(0.186) (0.248) (0.259)
24 <A g e≤ 26 0.609 0.813 0.771
(0.214)** (0.323)* (0.348)*
26 <A g e≤ 28 0.284 0.815 0.629
(0.266) (0.344)* (0.365)
28 <A g e≤ 30 1.127 1.465 1.135
(0.363)** (0.454)** (0.473)*
30 <A g e≤ 32 1.347 1.586 0.998
(0.424)** (0.518)** (0.510)
32 <A g e≤ 34 1.425 1.752 1.228
(0.423)*** (0.529)*** (0.519)*
34 <A g e≤ 36 1.327 1.766 1.090
(0.518)* (0.622)** (0.616)
36 <A g e≤ 38 -0.075 0.391 -0.519
(0.638) (0.670) (0.670)
Age > 38 -1.914 -1.279 -2.384
(0.761)* (0.790) (0.801)**
Note. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. One star means 5 percent signiﬁcant,
two 1 percent, three 0.1 percent. Model I has drivers eﬀect, Model II drivers and teams eﬀects,
Model III drivers, teams and match eﬀects. Each regression contains a quadratic on age, and years
dummies for 1995-1997, number of participants to each race, a dummy for rainy weather at the day
of the race, the track-length, the number of race-laps, a dummy for whether the race takes place
at the drivers home, interactions of the driver eﬀect with the length of tracks, with the number of
laps, with a dummy for rainy weather, and with a dummies for years after 1994.
29